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Autobiographical memories are precious, they shape our identity, guide our thinking and 
behaviour, and facilitate social bonds in both helpful and unhelpful ways. However, our 
memory does not function like a video-recorder as we might hope, rather memory is highly 
vulnerable to error and often goes un-questioned. The present study investigated the role of 
memory function and individuals’ willingness to question their memories. Adult participants 
(N = 329) were asked to recall either a positive or a negative memory in detail. They were 
then required to rate their nominated memory on a range of memory function statements, 
followed by answering questions related to how willing they would be to question their 
memory and providing strategies for verifying their nominated memory if its accuracy was 
called into question. Lastly, they rated their nominated strategies on both perceived 
reliability, cost, and how likely it would be that they would employ these strategies in the 
future.  In line with our hypotheses, the majority of participants had not previously 
questioned the validity of their memory and were unwilling to question their memory in the 
future. When examining the influence of memory function, results indicated that memory 
function was associated with verification in various ways. Specifically, the more helpful the 
memory was perceived to be, participants provided higher perceived reliability ratings for the 
strategies they would use to nominate their memories, lower perceived cost ratings, and 
overall, reported that they were less likely to use these strategies in the future. Overall, the 
findings of the present study demonstrate that despite the fallibility of memory, individuals 
are often reluctant to question the accuracy of their memory, and it is memory function that is 
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Memory Verification Decisions 
Memories are precious. Not only are our memories essential for our ability to 
function in everyday life; they also make us who we are (Schacter, 2013). Memories help us 
to establish and maintain social relationships and contribute to our sense of identity (Bluck, 
Alea, Habermas & Rubin, 2005). We turn the memories of our past experiences into a 
coherent narrative, which becomes our autobiography (Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 
2011). Yet although our personal memories often feel well-preserved and reliable—like 
photographs or videos—we do not remember the past as accurately as we might hope. 
Instead, memories are highly vulnerable to error (Schacter, 2013).  
How do memory errors occur?  
Broadly speaking, inaccurate memories can emerge via two routes. First, memories 
can be laid down in an inaccurate form. That is, we can make errors when we perceive and 
interpret our experiences, and then transfer those errors into memory. These encoding errors 
can be caused by internal factors, such as our expectations for how events should unfold 
(e.g., Payne, 2001; Tuckey & Brewer, 2003), our prior knowledge of an event (e.g., Fraser, 
2011), or our levels of distress (e.g., Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2002). Encoding 
errors can also be caused by external factors, such as the physical environment (e.g., 
visibility; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987) or the presence of a weapon (Saunders, 2008).  
Second, memories can become distorted after they are stored. Everytime we bring a 
memory to mind, it becomes neurobiologically ‘fragile’ (Schacter et al., 2011). While in this 
state, the memory is vulnerable to distortion. That is, we can ‘sweep’ information into the 
original memory—adding or changing details. To the extent that this post-event information 
is inaccurate, so too is the resulting memory (Loftus, 2005).  
   Since the 1970s, researchers have sought to identify the sources of post-event 
information that can distort people’s memories, and the conditions that make this 





phenomenon more or less likely. One important source of post-event information, for 
example, is our discussions with other people who experience the same event. In a seminal 
study conducted by Gabbert, Memon, and Allan (2003), for example, pairs of participants 
witnessed a short film of a woman returning a book to a university office. Unbeknown to 
participants, they actually witnessed the film shot from different perspectives, such that each 
member of the pair was exposed to different details. Half of the pairs were then given the 
opportunity to discuss the film, while the remainder were not. When subsequently 
interviewed individually, 71% of the witnesses who had discussed the event with their co-
witness reported details that they had not actually seen, but their co-witness had (see also 
Eisen, Gabbert, Ying, & Williams, 2017; Goodwin, Hannah, Nicholl, & Ferri, 2017; Hope, 
Ost, Gabbert, Healey, & Lenton, 2008; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008; Mojtahedi, Ioannou, & 
Hammond, 2019; Rechdan, Hope, Sauer, Sauerland, Ost, & Merckelbach, 2018).  
Another potential source of post-event information is the questions we are asked 
about our experiences. Loftus and Palmer (1974), for example, showed participants seven 
short film clips depicting traffic accidents and then asked them to answer specific 
questions—some of which pertained to the speed of the vehicles involved in the collision. 
To examine the effect of question wording, the researchers manipulated the verb that was 
used in the question. Some participants, for example, we asked “how fast were the cars 
going when they smashed into each other?” while others were asked “how fast were the cars 
going when they bumped into each other?” Participants’ speed estimates corresponded to the 
verb used. That is, those asked about a smash gave higher estimates than those asked about a 
bump. In fact, the verb used even influenced participants’ responses to subsequent questions; 
those asked about a smash were more likely than those asked about a bump to falsely recall 
broken glass at the scene (see also Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Zanni, 1975). In 
addition to the wording of questions, the format of the questions can also produce errors. In 
particular, the more questions provide information, the more likely that their responses—and 





in turn their memories—are likely to align with that information (e.g., “what colour was the 
car” versus “was the car blue?”; Ibabe & Sporer, 2004; Lipton, 1977). 
Researchers have uncovered a range of factors that can increase the effect of 
misleading post-event information, or misinformation. Unsurprisingly, for example, as the 
time interval since the witnessed event increases, so too does susceptibility to 
misinformation (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). Similarly, the number of times 
misinformation is repeated increases the extent to which it is accepted (Foster, Huthwaite, 
Yesberg, Garry, & Loftus, 2012). Factors pertaining to both the recipient of the 
misinformation (e.g., alcohol intoxication; Minzter, 2007) and the source of the 
misinformation (e.g., credibility, see Underwood & Pezdek, 1998; social attractiveness, see 
Vornik, Sharman, & Garry, 2003) have also been shown to be important.  
Further to memory distortion for experienced events, we also know that individuals 
can develop rich memories for events that never even happened (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). 
Concerns were first raised over this possibility in the 1990s, when an increasing number of 
people ‘recovered’ memories of highly traumatic events while undergoing therapy. Many of 
these memories concerned childhood sexual abuse, but others were for less plausible events 
such as alien abduction, satanic ritual abuse, forced pregnancies or abortions, and brutal 
torture (see Loftus & Davis, 2006; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994; McNally, 2003; Noblitt & 
Perskin, 2000). The vast majority of patients had no recollection of such events prior to 
entering therapy (McNally, 2003).  
Such claims led psychological scientists to ask whether memories for entire events 
could be ‘implanted’ using similar techniques to those used in therapy: guided imagery, 
hypnosis, and the explicit encouragement of speculation and imagination. In the seminal 
study in this area, participants were presented with brief narratives of four of their childhood 
experiences. Three of the events were true, provided by a family member. The other event 
was false: getting lost in a shopping mall and being found by a kind elderly stranger. In three 





interviews, participants were asked to write down everything that they remembered about 
each of the four events. By the end of the third session, 29% of participants reported 
“remembering” getting lost in the mall, and provided detailed descriptions about the event—
despite the fact that it never actually happened (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995).  
Since that study, numerous researchers have replicated and extended Loftus and 
Pickrell’s (1995) findings using variations on the false narrative paradigm. Individuals have 
been led to incorrectly remember that they rode in hot air balloons (Wade, Garry, Read, & 
Lindsay, 2002), met Bugs Bunny at a Disney resort (Braun, Ellis, & Loftus, 2002), spilt a 
bowl of punch at a wedding (Hyman & Billings, 1998), received holy communion despite 
not being Catholic (Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997), and put slime into their teacher’s desk 
(Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004). In fact, in one study, 70% of participants 
were led to falsely believe that they had committed a crime (Shaw & Porter, 2015; but see 
Wade, Garry, & Pezdek, 2018, for a more conservative estimate of around 30%).  
We also know now that complicated experimental analogues of dangerous 
therapeutic techniques are not required for false memories to develop. In fact, simply 
imagining an event can increase the confidence with which people believe it happened 
(Gary, Manning, & Loftus, 1996). Mazzoni and Memon (2003), for example, demonstrated 
that after imagining medical procedures such as tooth extractions or minor skin removal, 
40% of participants reported having a memory for the event. This imagination inflation 
effect can even lead people to hold to false memories for events that are bizarre and 
implausible (e.g., cutting a napkin with nail scissors; Thomas & Loftus, 2002) and fear-
inducing (e.g., being saved from drowning by a lifeguard; Heaps & Nash, 2001).  
How does post-event information distort memory?  
 The most well-supported account for the development of false memories is the 
source-monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). This framework 





holds that false memories arise due to source monitoring errors, in which an individual 
misattributes the source of a particular memory to a genuine experience (Johnson, 1997). 
People might confuse whether a particular detail was part of an experienced event, for 
example, or has simply come from other sources, such as imagination, the media, or being 
told by other people (Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). The source monitoring framework predicts 
that the likelihood of a source monitoring error will be a function of (1) the extent to which 
the characteristics of the misleading episode are similar to the original memory and (2) 
whether information relevant to the source is retrieved during recall (Johnson, 1997).  
Zaragoza and Lane (1994) investigated this source monitoring process with an 
eyewitness memory task. In their study, participants saw slides depicting a crime. They were 
then presented with written questions, some of which contained misinformation. Next, the 
participants engaged in a source monitoring task, in which they had to identify various true 
and false details items as read, seen, neither, or both. Participants frequently misidentified 
read items as being seen. That is, they misattributed the details contained in the written 
questions to the slide show (see also Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2002). Similar results have 
emerged when people imagine details of an event; they often misattribute those details to the 
original experience (Markham & Hynes, 1993) (see also Lindsay & Johnson, 2000; 
Mitchell, Johnson, & Mather, 2003; Volz, Stalk, Vaitl, & Ambach, 2019) .  
Why should we worry about false memories?  
False memories are concerning because our memories shape our identity and our 
behaviour. And indeed, false memories can have demonstrable consequences. Some of these 
consequences are relatively minor, such as the everyday mundane choices we make. 
Individuals who have been incorrectly led to believe that they had a negative experience 
with a particular food, for example, later tend to avoid that food (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009).  
Similarly, false memories about positive experiences with foods has led people to be willing 





to pay more for that food at the grocery store (Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wakefield, & 
Loftus, 2008).  
Yet other false memories can have catastrophic consequences. To see this, we need 
look only as far as the criminal justice system, which relies heavily on memory accounts 
from eyewitnesses to understand how crimes unfold and to apprehend and prosecute 
offenders (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006). But despite the faith the legal system places in 
eyewitness evidence, memory errors are a leading contributor to wrongful convictions 
(Innocence Project, 2020. Specifically, of 180 DNA exoneration cases reviewed in 2006, 
75% involved one or more eyewitnesses visually identifying an innocent person as the 
perpetrator (Wells et al., 2006). Despite the scientific evidence that eyewitness reports are 
highly vulnerable to error, such reports are often very persuasive to jurors (Lindsay, Wells, 
& O’Connor, 1989). For example, Shaw (2019) investigated whether people could identify 
false memories described by others. Participants were shown two videos; one video was of 
someone recounting a true emotional memory, and the other was of someone recounting an 
emotional false—but believed—memory. The results indicated that participants were no 
better than chance at identifying a false memory. 
The role of beliefs about memory  
 Are people’s beliefs about how memory works in line with the scientific evidence? 
Unfortunately, the answer appears to be no. In a seminal study, Loftus and Loftus (1980) 
asked psychology students and members of the public to rate (1) whether memory is 
permanent, and (2) whether memory is fallible and can decay. Results indicated that, 69% of 
members of the public and 84% of psychology students endorsed the statement suggesting 
memory is permanent.  Alarmingly, this belief in the infallibility of memory has been found 
consistently across multiple studies (Akhtar, Justice, Knott, Kibowski, & Conway, 2018; 
Simons & Chabris, 2011). Moreover, such beliefs extend beyond laypeople to criminal 





justice professionals for whom evaluating memory evidence forms an important part of their 
job (e.g., police, lawyers, judges; e.g., Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 
2006).    
 Misguided beliefs about memory also show little sign of correction over time. Wake, 
Green, and Zajac (2020) directly compared memory beliefs in a community sample to those 
from a sample collected 25 years earlier, using the same measure: the Beliefs about Memory 
Survey (Brown, Garry, Loftus & Silver, n.d.) to a community sample. Results indicated that, 
beliefs about memory permanence remained largely unchanged from data obtained 25 years 
earlier, in which participants believed that memory is permanent, however, beliefs about 
memory repression (such as for a traumatic event) over time had become more aligned with 
expert knowledge, suggesting some changes in laypeople’s beliefs about memory.  
Do people question their memories?  
If memories—even the very important ones—are vulnerable to error despite people 
tending to believe that they are reliable, then a crucial question arises: to what extent do 
people question the accuracy of their own memories? Research attempting to answer this 
question has yielded concerning findings. People are generally willing to accept their 
memories without question, even when those memories exhibit characteristics associated 
with inaccuracy—the emergence of new details over time, for example (Ost, 2016; Scoboria 
et al., 2017). This is the case even when the memories are wholly false (Scoboria et al., 
2017).  
Even more concerning is that finding that even when people do question their 
memories, they tend to do a poor job (Wade & Garry, 2005). More specifically, people 
appear to be driven to conclude that their memories are genuine. This approach should not 
surprise us—we know that people have a tendency to seek or interpret information that 
confirms their original beliefs and expectations as opposed to disconfirming evidence (see 





Nickerson, 1998). With regard to memory then, we would expect people to explicitly look 
for ways to validate their memories, rather than searching for evidence that could unearth 
errors (Nash, Wade, Garry, & Adelman, 2017, Wade, Nash & Garry, 2014).  
Making matters worse, the specific strategies people use to scrutinise their memories 
are often unreliable. Using Loftus and Pickrell’s (1995) seminal ‘Lost in the Mall’ study as a 
springboard, Wade and Garry (2005) asked participants to imagine that they had developed a 
false memory of being lost in the shopping mall as a child. The researchers then asked 
participants to engage in a series of metacognitive exercises requiring them to consider how 
they would disconfirm the memory. Responses were coded into the following categories; (1) 
check information with family, (2) check information with others, (3) return to the location 
of the event, (4) seek physical proof, (5) use cognitive memory strategies, and (6) look for 
inconsistencies.  
The most common strategy was seeking information from family members, followed 
by cognitive memory techniques such as concentrating hard and/or imagining the event. We 
know from the memory literature, however, that both of these strategies come with 
considerable risks. As demonstrated in co-witness studies, discussion among witnesses can 
lead to one person’s errors becoming part of another person’s account (Wright, Memon, 
Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009) (see also Eisen et al., 2017; Goodwin et al., 2017; Hope et al., 
2008; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008; Mojtahedi et al., 2019; Rechdan et al.,  2018). Similarly, 
using imagination as a verification technique can lead to source misattribution errors, in 
which people can misattribute details they have imagined to genuine experience (Garry, 
Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Garry & Polaschek, 2000; Li, Wang, & Otgaar, 2020; 
Loftus & Bernstein, 2005; Markham & Hynes, 1993; Nichols & Loftus, 2019), or even 
develop a memory for something they never experienced (Brennen, Dybdahl, & Kapidzic, 
2007; Edelstein, Alexander, Goodman & Newton, 2004; Irwanda & Maulina, 2019; Loftus 
& Pickrell, 1995; Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006).  





If the strategies with which people scrutinise their memories—if they scrutinise them 
at all—tend to be unreliable, then why are those strategies chosen? Wade, Nash, and Garry 
(2014) hypothesised that people’s strategy choice would be shaped by cost as well as 
reliability. In their study, participants were asked to describe a childhood memory and then 
to consider how they might determine if that memory really occurred if its accuracy was 
called into question. In addition, participants were asked to rate each strategy in terms of 
how likely they would be to use it, as well as its reliability (i.e., the likelihood that the 
information would be trustworthy) and cost (i.e., the extent to which the strategy would 
require them to spend time, effort, or money). Notably, most participants (82%) indicated 
that they would be most likely to choose the least costly of their five suggestions.  
Notably, the tendency to use low cost methods to scrutinise memories is not limited 
to low stakes memories. That is, even when the consequences of memory errors are 
considerable, people nonetheless turn to ‘cheap’ strategies to ascertain whether or not their 
memories are accurate. Nash and colleagues (2017), for example, asked participants how 
they would scrutinise their memory of an event, for two explicit purposes: (1) giving the 
police a statement and (2) telling a story to their family. The results demonstrated that while 
participants reported it was more important to establish that a memory is accurate when 
giving a police statement, they still were more likely to use strategies that were ‘cheap’ over 
more reliable methods (Nash, Wade, Garry, & Adelman, 2017). Similar findings have also 
been demonstrated in the context of memories for sexual abuse (Ost, 2016).  
In summary, a small body of work has focused on asking people whether they would 
question their memories and how they would do so. These studies show that people are often 
unwilling to question their memories and—if they do—they prefer strategies that are low-
cost over those that are more likely to be reliable. But one important question remains 
unanswered: what leads people to question their memories in the first place?  
 





The present study: Assessing the role of memory function 
One possible driver of people’s willingness to question their memories is memory 
valence, that is, people might be more willing to question negative memories than positive 
ones. After all, we know that people often try not to think about their negative experiences 
(Lyubomirsky, Boehm, Kasri, & Zehm, 2011), so perhaps they would be more willing to 
doubt the veracity of those memories as well. Yet one recent study casts doubt on the notion 
that people are less driven to “hold on” to negative memories than positive ones. When 
people contemplate fictional technology that would let them choose one memory to record 
in perfect fidelity, they choose memories that feel helpful, regardless of whether those 
memories are positive or negative (Burton-Wood, Strange, Rasmussen, & Garry, 2017).  
It seems, then, that the answer to our question might be more complex than people 
simply holding on to memories for positive experiences and seeking to get rid of memories 
for bad experiences. What else, then, might lead people to question their memories? We 
hypothesise that the answer lies in the function that the memory serves (Bluck, 2003). More 
specifically, we propose that people would be more likely to question memories that they 
perceive as unhelpful, relative to those perceived as helpful.  
Autobiographical memories appear to serve one or more of three main functions 
(Bluck, 2003): self-fulfilling functions (i.e., memories that influence the self-concept and 
self-continuity), directive functions (i.e., memories that guide behaviour), and social 
functions (i.e., memories that influence social bonds; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009). 
Importantly, any of these functions can be helpful or unhelpful. For example, a negative 
experience (e.g., a sudden death in the family) could serve a helpful social function (e.g., 
strengthening bonds among family members) or an unhelpful social function (e.g., straining 
relations among family members).  Research tells us that memories that serve positive 
functions have distinct benefits. These memories are shared more frequently in conversation, 
improve our social functioning (Bernsten & Thomsen, 2007), and have a positive impact on 





how people feel about themselves (Collins, Pillemer, Ivcevic, & Grooze, 2007). Some 
research also shows that memories with positive functions also increase psychological 
wellbeing. For example, Waters (2014) asked participants to describe four personally 
significant memories and rate those memories on a series of memory function statements 
(e.g., “I feel that this event has become a central part of my life story”) before completing a 
wellbeing questionnaire. Participants who reported that their autobiographical memories 
served positive functions reported significantly higher levels of purpose, communion, and 
positive relationships.  
Recently, Burnell, Rasmussen, and Garry (2020) investigated the perceived adaptive 
and maladaptive functions of autobiographical memories. In their study, participants were 
asked to provide either a positive or negative memory and were then asked to rate a series of 
memory function statements. Participants were also asked how willing they would be to 
erase their nominate memory if they had the opportunity. Positive memories were primarily 
seen as serving helpful functions, whereas negative memories were rated as serving both 
helpful and hurtful functions. Regardless of memory valence, participants were more willing 
to erase hurtful memories than helpful ones.  
Perhaps, then, individuals will also be less motivated—and therefore less likely—to 
scrutinise memories that they perceive as serving a helpful function. In the present study, we 
seek to test this hypothesis. Specifically, we asked people to rate the perceived functions of a 
nominated positive or negative memory and then to answer a series of questions regarding 
whether—and how—they would be likely to question that memory. To ensure that we 
generated memories that participants might be likely to question, we asked participants to 
recall a childhood memory—that is, a memory from when they were younger than 13 years-
old.  
We hypothesise that, to the extent that people perceive a memory as serving a helpful 
function, they will be (1) less likely to have questioned that memory in the past, (2) less 





willing to question that memory in the future, and (3) less likely to say they would employ 
self-generated strategies to verify it. Importantly, we expect these effects to occur 
independently of memory valence; that is, we expect memory function to mediate any effect 
of memory valence on these variables.   
Method 
Ethical Approval 
The study was reviewed and approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee, as a Category B application.  
Pre-Registration and Sample Size Calculation 
The study was pre-registered at www.aspredicted.org, noting the hypotheses, 
method, and planned analyses (see Appendix A for pre-registration document). Sample size 
was calculated based on a medium effect size (e.g., d = 0.50) and 95% power. A minimum 
number of 300 participants (150 per cell) was assessed as providing sufficient power to 
address our research questions, even with correction for multiple comparisons (alpha = .01) 
(Lakens, 2017).  
Participants 
 We recruited 370 participants through Amazon’s crowd sourcing website, Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). To be eligible to complete the study, participants were required to be aged 18 
years or older, located in the US and therefore most likely to reach a diverse English-
speaking population (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013), and have a previous MTurk task 
approval rate of at least 90%. All participants provided informed consent, and were 
compensated $1.00 USD for their time.  
 
 





Design and Procedure 
We utilised a between-subjects design with a single factor: memory valence (positive 
or negative). Participants were randomly assigned to experimental condition, such that there 
was a roughly equal number of participants in each cell.  
Participants completed the experiment individually online via the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk website (https://www.mturk.com/). On meeting the eligibility criteria and 
opting to participate, participants were presented with an Information Sheet detailing the aims 
of the research project, what participants would be required to do, and how the information 
would be utilised (see Appendix B). Those who were willing to participate then completed a 
Consent Form (see Appendix C) before beginning the experiment.   
The procedure began by asking participants to describe, in as much detail as possible, 
either a positive event (n = 187) or a negative event (n = 183) that they remember 
experiencing when they were younger than 13 years-old. Participants were asked to type a 
complete description of the entire event, “so that someone who was not there was able to 
understand exactly what was involved.” After submitting their description, participants were 
then prompted with “please read over your description of your event from your childhood 
and add any other details you can remember about this event to make your description as 
complete as possible.”  
For their nominated memory, participants were then asked to rate a series of seven 
memory function statements adapted from previous research (see Rasmussen & Bernsten, 
2009), using an 8-point scale with verbally anchored endpoints (see Table 1).  
Table 1  
Memory Function Statements 
 
This memory guides my thinking and behaviour in ways that: 
 
Are unhelpful  Are helpful 
0  7 







This memory guides my thinking and behaviour in ways that: 
 
Do not hurt me 
 Hurt me 
0  7  
 
This memory tells me something about my identity in ways that: 
 
Are unhelpful 
 Are helpful 
0  7  
 
This memory tells me something about my identity in ways that: 
 
Do not hurt me 
 Hurt me 
0  7  
 
I share this memory with other people in ways that: 
 
Are unhelpful 
 Are helpful 
0  7  
 
I share this memory with other people in ways that: 
 
Do not hurt me 
 Hurt me 
0  7  
 












The next part of the experiment was based on the methodology of Wade et al. (2014). 
Participants were first asked whether there had ever been a time when they had questioned 
their memory; they answered this question on a dichotomous scale (yes/no). Next, 
participants were asked (1) how likely it is that they would question their memory in the 
future, and (2) how likely it is they would take steps to scrutinise their memory if someone 





challenged its accuracy. Each of these questions was answered on a five-point verbally-
anchored scale (1 = extremely likely, 5 = extremely unlikely).   
After answering these questions, the participants were presented with the following 
instructions:  
“Now imagine you are sharing this memory with someone, and that person 
challenges your memory. This person says to you, “No, that never happened. 
You’ve remembered that wrong.” You begin to think “Did this really happen 
or have I imagined this? Your task is to now describe five strategies you would 
use to examine the accuracy of this memory.” 
Participants were then asked to nominate five strategies they would adopt to examine 
the accuracy of the memory. For each nominated strategy, participants were asked three 
questions, to be answered on a 5-point scale. First, they were asked “how reliable (i.e., 
trustworthy and accurate) is this information you get as a result of this strategy?” (1= not 
very reliable at all; 5 = extremely reliable). Second, participants were asked “how much cost 
does the strategy require you to spend in terms of money, time, effort, and energy?” (1= very 
small cost; to 5 = very high cost). Finally, participants were asked “how likely is it that you 
would use this strategy if this memory were to be challenged?” (1 = not very likely at all; 5 
= extremely likely). 
When participants had nominated all five strategies and answered the associated 
questions, the experiment ended. Participants were asked whether they had complied with 
the experiment’s requirements, such that they did not talk to anyone else whilst completing 
the study, completed the study within one sitting in an environment free from distraction, 
and without help from others. Participants were then thanked and debriefed, and reimbursed 
as appropriate.  






 All identifying information was removed from participants’ responses prior to coding. 
First, the memory descriptions were coded for the general nature of the events they referred 
to; word count was also calculated. For positive memories, nominated events were coded into 
the following six categories: (1) social, (2) achievement, (3) recreation, (4) gifts, (5) pets, and 
(6) other events (see Table 2). For negative memories, nominated events were coded into the 
following seven categories: (1) social, (2) health, (3) pets, (4) abandonment, (5) crime, (6) 
death, and (7) failures (see Table 3).   
Table 2 
Classification of Event Type for Positive Memories 
Event Type Definition Example 
Social Events associated with family, 
friends, or other associates 
“I went on a field trip with my best 
friend. We had a fun time eating pies 
and building candles” 
Achievement Events associated with achieving a 
milestone or award  
“When I was in fourth grade I won a 
presidential award in mathematics”  
Recreation Events involving recreation or 
activities 
“When I was 10 years-old I got to visit 
Disney World. I was with my family 
including my grandparents and it was 
very fun. We never did anything like 
that again”.  
Gifts Events associated with receiving or 
giving gifts 
“On my 10th birthday, my parents gave 
me my first video game” 
Pets Events involving pets or other 
animals 
“The best dog I ever had accidently 
wandered into my life” 
Other Events that did not meet the above 
criteria 
“When I was young, I was really 
naughty and was often getting into 
trouble, I remember feeling very happy 
for being naughty”.  
 
 






Classification of Event Type for Negative Memories 
Event Type Definition Example 
Social  Events associated with family, 
friends, or other associates 
“I remember my parents having a fight, 
I was 4 years old”. 
Health  Events associated with accidents, 
injuries, or health problems 
 “I fell and cut my hand and had to 
have stitches”.  
Pets Events involving pets or other 
animals 
“A car was going really fast and hit my 
dog”.  
Abandonment Events involving being left alone or 
abandonment  
“It was bedtime and my parents were 
still not home. I got worried and 
scared” 
Crime Events involving experiencing or 
witnessing  violence and/or crime 
“My dad was drunk and beat up my 
mum” 
Death Events involving death or suicide  “One negative event was the death of 
my brother 
Failures Events in involving own or 
significant others’ failures or loss 
“I remember when I lost a bracelet 
when I was six. I cried because I 
couldn’t find it”  






Second, the five verification strategies provided by participants were coded into the 
following six categories: (1) asking others, (2) using cues, (3) using photos/videos, (4) 
physical evidence, (5) using cognitive strategies, or (6) other (see Table 4).  Two coders 
independently coded 20% of the transcripts to establish inter-rater reliability; the kappa co-
efficient was 0.964. Any disagreements were resolved through discussion and the primary 
coder coded the remaining transcripts. 
 
 






Examples of Verification Strategies Provided by Participants  
Strategy Definition Example 
Asking Others This strategy involved directly asking 
other people about the event.  
“Ask my parents about their 
recollection of my years playing 
baseball” 
Using Cues This strategy involved using sensory cues 
as a memory aid.  
“I would return to the school to 
see if it jogged any memories” 
Using Photos/Videos This strategy involved viewing photos or 
videos that were associated with the event 
in question. 
“Look at photos to verify what 
happened”  
Physical Evidence This strategy involved searching for 
physical evidence associated with the 
accuracy of the memory.  
“Search for the divorce papers” 
Cognitive Strategies This strategy involved using cognitive 
techniques to recall components of the 
memory.  
“Close my eyes and imagine 
what happened”  
Other This involved other strategies provided by 
participants that did not fit the other five 
domains.  
“Seek therapy or hypnosis” 
 
Results 
Exclusions and Final Sample 
 
Disingenuous responding was indicated—and therefore a participant’s data and 
excluded—if they incorrectly answered either of the two attention check questions, provided 
inadequate work (e.g., copying text from a webpage, not following instructions, typing 
random or nonsensical text when describing their memory), indicated that they had not 
followed the experiment requirements, or failed to provide five different strategies for 
verifying their memories.  





Based on these criteria, data from 41 participants were removed prior to analysis. 
Data from 37 participants were removed due to failure to provide five strategies for verifying 
their memory, and data from a further four participants were removed due to inadequate work 
(e.g., copying from a webpage). These exclusions left us with a final sample of 329 




Data analyses were conducted using IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS), version 25. Mediation analyses were conducted using the PROCESS v3.3 Macro for 
SPSS, Model 4 (Hayes, 2013). Our major analyses were conducted according to our pre-
registration document. Where additional analyses have been conducted, they are noted in the 
text as exploratory. 
After examining descriptive data for the types of events reported and the verification 
strategies nominated, we conducted four sets of analyses. First, we examined the influence on 
memory valence (positive or negative) on memory function scores. Second, we examined the 
influence of memory valence on several dependent variables: whether participants had 
questioned the memory in the past, their willingness to question it in the future, the perceived 
reliability and cost of their nominated verification strategies, and the likelihood of them using 
these strategies. Third, we evaluated the influence of memory function on these same 
dependent variables. Finally, mediation models were used to determine whether memory 
function mediated any association between memory valence and our other dependent 
variables. 
Nominated Events   
The nature of the positive and negative memories that participants described are 
shown in Figures 1 and 2.  










Participants’ Nominated Events For Negative Memories 
 
The number of words that participants wrote about their nominated memory ranged 
from 9 to 422 words (M = 86.830, SD = 52.362). An exploratory analysis showed that word 














































88.120, SE = 3.814; negative memories M = 85.570, SE = 4.358), even when outliers (values 
outside of 2SD from the mean) were replaced with the next numerical value, t(325) = 0.764, p 




The majority of participants (87%) indicated that they had not previously questioned 
the accuracy of their memory. When asked how likely is it that they would question this 
memory in the future, 56% of participants responded that it was ‘extremely unlikely.’ 
Similarly, when asked how likely it was that they would take steps to validate the memory, 
33% of participants indicated that it was ‘extremely unlikely.’   
 Recall that participants were asked to nominate five strategies that they would use to 
verify their memories should those memories be questioned. Participants nominated a range 
of strategies; we coded these strategies into one of six categories (see Figure 3). The most 
common was to ask others (30%), followed by using cognitive techniques (26.2%), searching 
for and using physical evidence (12.3%), using photos or videos (7.4%), and using memory 
cues (4.0%). The remaining strategies (20.1%) did not fit into one of these categories.  
Figure 3 

































Next, we examined participants’ perceptions of the strategies they nominated—their 
reliability, their cost, and the likelihood that participants would use them. These data are 
presented in Table 5, as a function of strategy type. With regards to reliability, participants 
rated the use of photos and videos as the most reliable strategy, closely followed by physical 
evidence. The least reliable strategy was using cues. In terms of cost, the means for all 
strategies fell below the scale midpoint (3), suggesting that they were seen as ‘low-cost’; the 
highest cost strategy was ‘other’ followed by physical evidence, and the lowest cost strategy 
was asking others. Finally, participants indicated that they were most likely to use cues, and 
least likely to use photos and videos.      
Table 5 
Perceived Reliability, Cost, and Likelihood of Using Nominated Strategies 
Strategy type Reliability M (SE) Cost M (SE) Likelihood M (SE) 
Asking others 3.795 (0.054) 1.444 (0.036) 2.308 (0.063) 
Cognitive strategies 3.276 (0.059) 1.596 (0.042) 2.167 (0.058) 
Physical evidence 4.024 (0.082) 1.871 (0.068) 2.391 (0.092) 
Photos/videos 4.297 (0.095) 1.471 (0.062) 1.942 (0.119) 
Using cues 3.261 (0.153) 1.692 (0.098) 2.508 (0.154) 
Other 3.465 (0.074) 1.924 (0.057) 2.184 (0.069) 
 
The Influence of Memory Valence on Perceived Memory Function  
 
Recall that participants rated their nominated memory on seven memory function 
statements (see Table 1). For ease of interpretation, we reverse-scored the negatively scored 
statements (e.g., “this memory guides my thinking and behaviour in ways that hurt me/do not 
hurt me”) so that higher values on all statements indicated higher perceived helpfulness and 
less perceived hurtfulness. We also averaged across all memory function statements to arrive 
at a memory function composite score for each participant.  
The influence of memory valence on individual function scores was analysed using 
independent samples t-tests (see Table 6).  Positive memories were rated as more likely to 





guide thinking and behaviour in ways that were helpful, and telling something about identity 
in ways that were helpful. Positive memories were also more likely to be rated more highly 
on a scale of measuring a sense of belonging with others.  
Table 6 
The influence of memory valence on individual memory function scores (df = 327)  





Guides my thinking and behaviour in 
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Share this memory with others in ways 
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Gives me a sense of disconnection from 





11.632 < .001 




13.039 < .001 
 
 
The Influence of Memory Valence on Memory Verification 
 
Regardless of memory valence, few participants had questioned their memory in the 
past, just 12.7% of those who asked to recall a positive memory and 13.6% of those asked to 
recall a negative memory. A Chi-square test revealed that this difference was not statistically 
significant, X2 (1, N  = 329) = .071, p = .789. Memory valence was, however, associated with 
participants’ reported willingness to question the memory in the future, with participants 
being more willing to question negative memories than positive memories (see Table 7). 





 Our next step was to consider whether memory valence was associated with the 
perceived reliability of, cost of, and likelihood of using the verification strategies that 
participants nominated. To do this, we calculated mean reliability, cost, and likelihood scores 
by averaging across values given for the five strategies nominated by each participant. We 
then examined these variables as a function of memory valence. As shown in Table 7, 
participants recalling positive memories nominated verification strategies with a higher 
perceived reliability than participants recalling negative memories. The relation between 
memory function and perceived cost of verification strategies was marginally significant, but 
in the opposite direction: participants recalling negative memories nominated verification 
strategies with a higher perceived cost than participants recalling positive memories. Memory 
valence was associated with participants’ ratings of how likely they would be to use the 
nominated strategies if they accuracy of the memory was challenged. Specifically, 
participants in the negative memory condition reported that they would be more likely to use 
their nominated strategies, relative to participants in the positive memory condition. 
Table 7 
The Influence of Memory Valence on Composite Scores (df = 327) 


























Note: * p < .05, # p = .07 
 





The Influence of Memory Function on Verification 
 
 Next, we examined the association between memory function and memory 
verification. A logistic regression confirmed that perceived function composite score 
predicted whether the memory had been questioned in the past, X2 (1) = 7.180, p = .007. 
More specifically, the more helpful the memory was perceived to be, the less likely the 
participant was to report having questioned it (β =  0.302, SE = 0.113, Wald = 7.128, p = 
.008, OR = 1.352).  
Table 8 shows the correlations among memory function scores and our memory 
verification variables. Several significant correlations emerged. Most notably, the more 
helpful a memory was perceived to be, the higher the perceived reliability—and the lower the 
perceived cost—of the strategies nominated to question it. Furthermore, the more helpful 
participants perceived their memory to be, the lower their reported likelihood that they would 
employ their nominated strategies.  
Table 8 










Willingness Composite .018    
Reliability Composite .259* .179*   
Cost Composite -.284* -.210* -.036*  
Likelihood Composite  -.199* .031* -.308* .240* 
Note: *p < .05 
Mediation Analyses  
 
The final stage of our analysis was to examine whether memory function mediated the 
effects of memory valence on memory verification approaches. To do this, we conducted 
mediation analyses using bias-corrected, bootstrapped confidence interval procedures 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004; see Figure 5.) We adopted this approach because (a) it does not 





assume that the sampling distribution of the indirect effect is normally distributed, (b) it has 
higher power in smaller sample sizes, and (c) it results in fewer Type 1 errors; thereby 
producing more reliable estimates of effects (Hayes, 2009).  
 We tested simple mediation models for the three outcome measures that were 
associated with both memory valence and memory function: reliability composite, cost 
composite, and likelihood composite. In each of the models, memory valence served as the 
predictor and memory function served as the proposed mediator. For each mediation analysis, 
5000 bootstrapped samples were drawn with replacement form the original data, as 
recommended by Hayes (2009). Indirect effects and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were 
then calculated from these results. Standardised regression coefficients (β), Standard Error 
(SE), and 95% confidence intervals (CI) are shown in Tables 9, 10, and 11.   
Figure 5 
A Visual Depiction of the Proposed Mediating Models  
 
Reliability Composite  
Examination of the direct effects (path a) indicated that, memory valence significantly 
predicts memory function, and that memory valence explains 34% of the variance in memory 
function, and that as memory valence increases (i.e. negative memory), then memory 
path a 
path ab (indirect effect) 
path b 
path c’ (direct effect) 
path c (total effect) 
Mediator  
Predictor   Outcome 





function decreases (R2 = .342).1 As shown in Table 9, higher memory function scores 
predicted higher perceived reliability of strategies nominated by participants (path b). 
However, memory valence did not predict reliability composite scores after accounting for 
the mediating effect of memory function (path c’). Examination of the total effects indicated 
that memory valence exerted a significant effect on reliability composite prior to considering 
memory function as the mediator (p < .050; path c). Specifically, memory valence explained 
1.84% of the variance in participants reliability ratings of their nominated strategies (R2 = 
.018).  Interpretation of the full bootstrapped mediation model presented in Table 6 indicated 
that, valence exerted statistically significant indirect effects on reliability composite through 
memory function (95% CIs exclude zero, indicating p < .050; path ab). 
Figure 6 














                                               
1 Because values for path a are consistent across all mediation analyses, we have omitted them from subsequent 
sections.   
Memory Valence  
Memory Function 
Reliability Composite 
path ab (indirect effect) 
ß  = -.266 
path a 
ß  = -1.684 
path b 
ß  = .158 
path c’ (direct effect) 
ß  = .040 
path c (total effect) 
ß  = -.226 






Bias-corrected bootstrapping mediation analyses of the impact of memory valence on 
reliability composite scores and memory function composite scores 
Path  Memory Valence 
  ß SE p 
 Total Effect 
c  Valence à Reliability Composite -.226 .091 .014 
 Direct Effects 
a Valence à Function -1.684 .129 .014 
b Function à Reliability Composite .158 .038 <.001 
c’ Valence à Reliability Composite .040 .110 .714 
 Indirect Effects (through mediator) 
ab Valence à Reliability Composite -.266 .065  
 95% CI of Bootstrap -.398 to -1.143 
 Model Summary R2 p  
  .018 0.014  
Note: Path labels reflect standard terminology (cf. Fritz and MacKinnon, 2007 ) and are depicted in Figure 6; c 
and c’ reflect the total and direct effect of memory valence on reliability composite scores, before and after 
accounting for memory function, respectively. 
 
Cost Composite  
 
 As shown in Table 10, higher memory function scores predicted lower perceived cost 
of strategies nominated by participants (path b). However, memory valence did not predict 
cost composite after accounting for the mediating effect of memory function (path c’). 
Examination of the total effects indicated that memory valence did not exert a significant 
effect on cost composite scores.  Interpretation of the full bootstrapped mediation model 
indicated that valence exerted statistically significant indirect effects on cost composite (95% 


























Bias-corrected bootstrapping mediation analyses of the impact of memory valence on cost 
composite scores and memory function composite scores 
Path  Memory Valence 
  ß SE p 
 Total Effect 
c  Valence à Cost Composite .134 0.74 <.000 
 Direct Effects 
a Valence à Function -1.684 0.129 .0140 
b Function à Cost Composite -.160 0.030 <.000 
c’ Valence à Cost Composite .134 0.074 .070 
 Indirect Effects (through mediator) 
ab Valence à Cost Composite .269 0.052  
 95% CI of Bootstrap .170 to .374 
 Model Summary R2 p  
  .010 .070  
Note: Path labels reflect standard terminology (cf. Fritz and MacKinnon, 2007 ) and are depicted in Figure 7; c 
and c’ reflect the total and direct effect of memory valence on cost composite scores, before and after 
accounting for memory function, respectively. 
Memory Valence  
Memory Function 
Cost Composite 
path ab (indirect effect) 
ß  = .269 
path a 
ß  = -1.68 
path b 
ß  = -.160 
path c’ (direct effect) 
ß  = .1.34 
path c (total effect) 
ß  = .134 





Likelihood Composite  
 
 As shown in Table 11, memory function negatively predicted likelihood composite 
scores, indicating that higher memory function scores predicted lower likelihood of 
participants using their nominated strategies to question their memories (path b). However, 
memory valence did not predict likelihood composite after accounting for the mediating 
effect of memory function (path c’). Examination of the total effects indicated that memory 
valence exerted a significant effect on likelihood composite prior to considering the 
mediators (p < .05; path c). Specifically, valence explained 1.41% of the variance in 
participants likelihood of using their proposed strategies in the future (R2 = .0141). 
Interpretation of the full bootstrapped mediation model indicated that valence exerted 
statistically significant indirect effects on likelihood composite through memory function 
(95% CIs exclude zero, indicating p < .050; path ab). 
Figure 8 

















Memory Valence  
Memory Function 
Likelihood Composite 
path ab (indirect effect) 
ß  = .197 
path a 
ß  = -1.68 
path b 
ß  = -.117 
path c’ (direct effect) 
ß  = .006 
path c (total effect) 
ß  = .202 






Bias-corrected bootstrapping mediation analyses of the impact of memory valence on 
likelihood composite scores and memory function composite scores 
Path  Memory Valence 
  ß SE p 
 Total Effect    
c  Valence à Likelihood Composite .202 .094 .031 
 Direct Effects    
a Valence à Function -1.68 .129 .014 
b Function à Likelihood Composite -.117 .040 .003 
c’ Valence à Likelihood Composite .006 .114 .960 
 Indirect Effects (through mediator)    
ab Valence à Likelihood Composite .197 .063  
 95% CI of Bootstrap .080 to .325   
 Model Summary R2 p  
  .014 .031  
Note: Path labels reflect standard terminology (cf. Fritz and MacKinnon, 2007 ) and are depicted in Figure 8; c 
and c’ reflect the total and direct effect of memory valence on likelihood composite scores, before and after 



















Overall, very few people in our study entertained the notion that their memory might 
not be accurate. In fact, 87% of participants had not previously questioned their nominated 
memory, while only 19% of participants reported that they would be ‘likely’ or ‘extremely 
likely’ to question it in the future. These findings are largely consistent with those of previous 
research, which has demonstrated that people tend to take their recollections at face-value—
seldom considering the likelihood or consequence of memory errors (e.g., Ost, 2016; 
Scoboria et al., 2017; Wade & Garry, 2005). This reluctance may be in part explained by the 
fact that many laypeople are unaware of the fallibility of memory (e.g., Akhtar et al., 2018; 
Simon & Chabris, 2011; Wake et al., 2020). That is, if individuals believe that memories are 
both accurate and permanent, they likely see little reason to question them.  
We were interested, however, in the role of perceived memory function in the 
likelihood that people would question their memories. We hypothesised that, to the extent 
that people perceive a memory as serving an adaptive function, they would be (1) less likely 
to have questioned that memory in the past, (2) less willing to question that memory in the 
future, and (3) less likely to say they would employ self-generated strategies to verify it. We 
expected these effects to occur independently of memory valence. Our findings were largely 
in line with these hypotheses, and are discussed below.  
The role of memory function 
 
Although memory function did not influence the likelihood that memories had been 
questioned in the past, participants who perceived their nominated memory as serving a more 
helpful—and less hurtful—function expressed less willingness to question the memory in the 
future. Moreover, when asked to generate strategies to question a memory, people who 
perceived their nominated memory as more adaptive indicated less likelihood of using those 
strategies.   





This finding was in line with our predictions. We know from other research that 
autobiographical memories serve important functions such as being self-fulfilling, directive, 
and social functions, and that these functions relate to higher levels of purpose and positive 
relationships (Waters, 2014). Furthermore, when people are asked to contemplate fictional 
technology that would let them preserve any memory, they tend to choose memories that they 
perceive to be helpful, regardless of whether they are positive or negative (Burnell et al., 
2020; Burton-Wood et al., 2017; Newman, Berkowitz, Nelson, Garry, & Loftus, 2011).  
Therefore, the present findings provide further support for the role of memory function in 
people’s ‘attachment’ to their memories.  
The role of memory valence 
 
  We expected memory function to at least partially account for associations between 
memory valence and memory verification behaviour. We know that individuals often spend 
less time thinking about, rehearsing, and speaking about negative memories (Rasmussen & 
Bernsten, 2011), and that negative memories can have significant negative effects on mental 
health (Fiedler, Nickel, Muehlfriedel, & Unkelbach, 2001). Consequently, we might predict 
that people might be more willing and likely to question the validity of their negative 
memories, relative to positive ones—especially in cases where discovering that a negative 
memory was not entirely accurate would ease its psychological burden.   
However, we also know that memory valence does not enjoy a perfect relationship 
with memory function. As seen in Burnell et al.’s (2020) study, for example, although 
positive memories are more likely to be seen as serving positive functions, negative 
memories can be seen as serving both helpful and unhelpful functions. For example, a 
negative experience might have caused significant emotional distress, but it might also have 
helped the person grow stronger, strengthen their connections with others, or even change in 
their life path for the better (Bluck, 2017). For example, literature on posttraumatic stress 





disorder suggests that people often perceive themselves to have grown, in a psychological 
sense, following a traumatic event (e.g., Schuettler & Boals, 2011). Therefore, even if a 
memory is negative, if it is perceived to serve a helpful function, then a person might be more 
driven to hold onto it. In Burnell and colleagues’ (2020) study, for example, people given the 
hypothetical option of erasing a negative memory were less likely to consider that option if 
the memory was perceived to be helpful.   
 Although we found that perceived memory function was associated with memory 
valence, we found mixed results for our mediation hypothesis. First, we found that memory 
valence was not associated with whether or not an individual had questioned their memories 
in the past. This provides further support for the alarming finding that people are often 
reluctant to question their memories in the first place, and that perhaps, if and when they do – 
there is more to the equation than just memory valence.  
Second, we found that only memory function—and not memory valence—was 
associated with participants’ willingness to question their memories in the future. That is, 
participants who saw their nominated memory as serving a more adaptive function said they 
would be less willing to question the memory in the future. This may be in part due to the fact 
that if a memory is highly adaptive, it may be perceived as too valuable to risk questioning. 
After all, we know that if an individual decides that a memory is false or fragmented, it can 
lose its importance (Wade et al., 2014). One other possible explanation for why people are 
reluctant to question their memories could be due to the perceived consequences of changing 
memories. For example, many people believe that changing people’s memories in therapy 
can have negative consequences (Nash et al., 2016).  
 Moreover,  the present study uniquely investigated whether memory function 
mediates the relationship between memory valence and the dependent variables: reliability 
scores, cost scores, and the likelihood of using the nominated strategies or verifying memory 
in the future. As hypothesised, memory function mediated the relationship between memory 





valence and the dependent variables. That is,  once participants nominated their five 
verification strategies, the more adaptive they perceived their memory to be, the higher they 
perceived the strategies to be in terms of reliability, lower in cost, and the less likely they said 
they would be to employ these strategies in the future. This indicates that memory function 
plays a significant role in influencing participants judgements on how reliable and costly their 
method for verifying memory is, further biasing their decisions and leading to the possibility 
of increasing memory errors. For example, when a memory serves a high function, such as 
shaping an individual’s identity and behaviour or providing a sense of belonging with others, 
their judgements of how reliable methods for verifying memory become inflated, and the 
perceived cost are deflated. This provides further support for the idea that individuals choose 
methods that are more likely to simply confirm their memory is accurate, and therefore 
memory errors remain largely un-questioned.  
Memory verification strategies 
 
Participants provided a range of strategies for verifying their memories. Alarmingly, 
however, many of those strategies would run the risk of providing unreliable information. For 
example, 30% of participants reported that they would seek information from others (such as 
family members and friends), yet we know that discussing events with others can lead 
memories to because tainted by the details provided by other people (Gabbert et al., 2003; 
Hope et al., 2008; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008; Mojtahedi et al., 2019; Rechdan et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, 26% of participants also reported that they would use cognitive strategies such 
as imagining an event, which can also contribute to increased confidence that the event 
happened as imagined (Gary et al., 1996; Heaps & Nash, 2001;Mazzoni & Memon, 2003; 
Thomas & Loftus, 2003) or lead to memory inaccuracies (Schacter et al., 2011).  In fact, our 
results indicated that participants perceived asking others and cognitive strategies as reliable 
methods of verifying memories (as indicated by scores above the midpoint). Providing 





further support to previous research findings, that laypeople’s understanding about memory 
and the potential for errors is often low (Wake et al., 2020).  
The verification strategies that participants provided in the current study were largely 
consistent with those of previous studies, which have also found that individuals often use 
strategies that could fail to unearth errors, or could even strengthen them (Wade et al., 2014; 
Wade & Garry, 2005). These results have been found for both childhood as well as recent 
memories, for personally important as well as trivial memories, for memories for which 
accuracy is crucial (e.g., providing a police statement) as well as memories for which it is not 
(e.g., telling family; Nash et al., 2017), and—now—for positive as well as negative 
memories.  
Why would individuals choose verification strategies that could maintain or increase 
memory errors? One possibility, of course, is that people nominate feasible strategies. Few of 
our experiences, for example, could be verified using physical evidence, whereas many 
would involve another ‘witness’ to ask. Previous research, however, has also suggested that 
people tend to choose low-cost methods—methods that do not require large amounts of time 
or effort (such as asking another person, compared to searching for physical evidence; Nash 
et al., 2017). The preference for low-cost methods may be due to the tendency for individuals 
to seek out information that confirms their original belief, known as the confirmation bias 
(Nickerson, 1998). Given that our lives and our identities are shaped by our memories (Bluck 
et al., 2005), perhaps it is easier to confirm a memory is accurate, than seek evidence to 
disconfirm it. For example, reminiscing about past experiences can increase subjective 
reports of wellbeing (McLean & Lilgendahl, 2008), improve relationships with romantic 
partners (Alea & Bluck, 2007) and even help someone pursue certain career paths (Pillemer, 
2003). With those benefits in mind, it is likely that the benefits of thinking about a memory at 
face-value outweigh the benefits of questioning the accuracy.  





We did not make specific predictions about the relations among memory function, 
memory valence, and perceptions of strategy reliability and cost. We observed, however, that 
as the perceived adaptive qualities of a memory increased, participants were more likely to 
rate their verification strategies as more reliable and of lower cost; in fact, memory function 
mediated the effect of memory valence on these two variables. There are two possible ways 
that these findings could manifest: first, participants who perceived their memories as more 
adaptive might have nominated strategies that they considered to be more reliable and less 
costly; second, participants’ might have rated the same strategies as more reliable and less 
costly if they perceived their memories as more adaptive. Unfortunately, we had insufficient 
statistical power to disentangle these possibilities by assessing the correlations between 
memory function and perceived reliability and cost separately for each event type.  
Strengths and Limitations  
The present study fills a distinct gap in the literature. Despite this strength, however, 
the present study is not without limitations. The primary limitation of the present study its 
ability to identify causal relationships. More specifically, it is possible that people used their 
willingness to question a memory as an indicator of its function, rather than vice versa. The 
next step in this research, then, is to replicate the findings using an experimental design in 
which we seek to manipulate perceived memory function using a false feedback paradigm 
(for examples, see Braun et al., 2002; Lindsay et al., 2004; Shaw & Porter, 2015; Wade et 
al., 2002).    
On a related point, participants were presented with the memory function statements 
before they were asked to entertain the notion of questioning their memory. Doing so may 
have primed participants to consider memory function when answering subsequent 
questions. Future research could overcome this limitation by counterbalancing the order in 





which questions are presented to participants. In previous research adopting this approach, 
however, order effects have been very small, if present at all (see Burnell et al., 2020)  
Another limitation is that our findings might not translate to memories that are less 
salient. Participants were asked to nominate “one very positive/negative event that happened 
to you when you were younger than 13 years-old”. It is therefore likely that they   
nominated an important or salient memory, as it is often these that spring to mind  
(Buchanan, 2007) and are richer in detail (Burton-Wood et al., 2017). If that was the case, 
then these memories might also be less likely to be questioned than less salient—albeit still 
function-serving—memories. It is also of note that many of the types of memories that our 
participants nominated (e.g., the death of a relative) would be very unlikely to be wholly 
false, even if some peripheral details might be inaccurate.   
Finally, the range of memory function statements that we used pertained to the 
primary functions of memory: guiding thinking and behaviour, shaping identity, sharing 
with others, and providing connection with others (Alea & Bluck, 2007). However, there are 
other functions that memories can serve. These include regulating emotions (Pasupathi, 
2003), forming a social identity (Bernsten, 2009), and maintaining intimacy (Webster, 
2003); none of these functions were assessed in the present study. Therefore, the current 
study’s restricted conceptualisation of memory function may have limited the conclusions 
that can be drawn about what particular memory functions have higher influence on memory 




Limitations aside, our findings—alongside those of other similar research—have 
important real-world implications for the identification of memory errors.  





In most situations, memory errors cause little damage. For example, we might 
misattribute something we saw in a movie for something someone has said, or we might 
remember having a conversation with a friend that we only thought about having. However, 
in some contexts, memory errors can have devastating and long-term consequences. Our 
findings, alongside those of prior research, indicate that memories that are seen as serving 
helpful functions are less likely to be questioned. If replicated, these findings could have 
particularly important implications in legal and clinical settings. 
Legal implications. An estimated 77,000 US suspects each year become defendants 
solely on the basis of testimony from a witness (Wells et al., 1998). The legal system relies 
heavily on these eyewitness memory accounts, yet we know that such accounts are prone to 
error. It would be helpful, then, if people would question these memories thoroughly rather 
than accepting them at face value.  
However, even when people do take steps to verify their memories, the methods that 
people often use to do so may serve to increase the potential for error. For example, 
imagining a memory serves to maintain—and possibly even increase—false memories, as 
well as increasing the confidence with which the memory is held (e.g., Garry et al., 1996). 
Because we know that highly confident witnesses are more persuasive in the courtroom 
(Leippe, Manion, & Romanczyk, 1992), such strategies are likely to increase the potential 
for wrongful conviction. 
Arguably, the most problematic false memories in the legal context are those 
of sexual abuse (McHugh, Lief, Freyd & Fetkewicz 2004). Because these cases so rarely 
involve corroborating physical or eyewitness evidence, they frequently boil down to the 
memory of one person: the complainant. Of course, well-intentioned-but-false accusations of 
sexual assault can have devastating effects on those who are accused and their families. In 
many retracted cases of alleged childhood sexual abuse, the alleged perpetrator had charges 
laid against them (Loftus & Ketchum, 1997). In fact, even after the accusation was 





retracted, the relationship between the accused and the accuser is often irreconcilable 
(McHugh et al., 2004).  
Clinical implications. Memories for negative experiences can have considerable 
negative effects on psychological wellbeing—effects that are likely to lead people to seek 
professional help (Agaibi & Wilson, 2005). We know, however, that therapists sometimes 
help their clients to reconceptualise negative memories as serving a helpful function (Paivio 
& Pascual-Leone, 2010). However, by doing so, such attempts could actually decrease 
people’s tendency to scrutinise their memories, and increase their use of low-cost, unreliable 
strategies when they do scrutinise them. If those memories are inaccurate—in whole or in 
part—then the therapeutic process could unnecessarily maintain psychological dysfunction.  
Conclusions  
 Despite decades of research into the fallibility of memory, individuals are often 
unwilling to entertain the thought that their memories might not be wholly accurate—even 
when explicitly asked to. The present research has identified perceived memory function as 
an important potential driver of this reluctance. Although memories are precious and can 
have positive functions such as shaping our identity and strengthening social bonds, we 
should not let those functions stop us from being open to the fact that the memory could 
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1) Have any data been collected for this study already? 
It's complicated. We have already collected some data but explain in Question 8 why readers 
may consider this a valid pre-registration nevertheless. 
 
2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study? 
1) When considering positive memories, as compared with negative memories, people will: 
 
a. be less likely to have questioned the memory in the past 
b. be less willing to question that memory in the future, and less likely to take steps to 
scrutinise the memory if someone challenged its accuracy 
c. be less likely to pursue strategies they nominate to scrutinise the memory 
 
2) The extent to which a memory is perceived to have helpful functions will mediate the 
effects described in (1). 
 
We will also explore the same mediation relationships in models where average strategy 
reliability and cost are the outcome variables, but we do not have a priori directional 
hypotheses for these models. 
 
3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured. 
Participants in both valence conditions will be asked: 
 
1) whether there has ever been a time when they have questioned their memory; 
2) how likely it is that they would question their memory in the future, and; 
3) how likely it is they would take steps to scrutinise their memory if someone challenged its 
accuracy. 
 
Participants will answer (1) on a dichotomous scale (yes/no) and (2) and (3) on five-point 
verbally-anchored scales (1 = extremely likely, 5 = extremely unlikely). 
 
We will also measure the perceived function of the nominated memory. Participants will be 
asked to rate their memory according to the following 7 statements: 
 





1. This memory guides my thinking and behaviour in ways that (0 = are unhelpful; 7 = are 
helpful) 
2. This memory guides my thinking and behaviour in ways that (0 = do not hurt me; 7 = do 
hurt me) 
3. This memory tells me something about my identity in ways that (0 = are unhelpful; 7 = are 
helpful) 
4. This memory tells me something about my identity in ways that (0 = do not hurt me; 7 = 
do hurt me) 
5. I share this memory with other people in ways that (0 = are helpful; 7 = are helpful) 
6. I share this memory with other people in ways that (0 = do not hurt me; 7 = do hurt me) 
7. This memory gives me a sense of (0 = disconnection from other people; 7 = belonging 
with other people). 
 
Finally, participants will consider a situation in which the accuracy of their memory was 
challenged. They will be asked to describe five strategies they could adopt to examine the 
accuracy of the memory. For each strategy, participants will answer three questions: 
 
1. How reliable (i.e., trustworthy and accurate) is this information you will get as a result of 
this strategy? (1 = not very reliable at all; 5 = extremely reliable) 
2. How much cost does the strategy require in terms of money, time, effort, and energy? (1= 
very small cost; 5 = very high cost) 
3. How likely is it that you would pursue this strategy? (1 = not very likely at all; 5 = 
extremely likely) 
 
4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to? 
Our only independent variable is memory valence, which will be manipulated between-
subjects. Participants will either be asked to bring to mind a very positive memory or a very 
negative memory. Participants will be randomly assigned to condition. 
 
5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main 
question/hypothesis. 
1. We will examine the influence of memory valence (positive or negative) on each of the 
memory function scores, using a series of t-tests. We will also convert participants’ memory 
function ratings into a single memory function composite score by calculating the average 
across the seven items; higher scores will indicate more helpful functions. We will also use a 
t-test to examine this composite score as a function of memory valence. (Adjusted alpha for 
multiple comparisons = .01.) 
 
2. We will then examine the influence of memory valence on: 
 
a. Whether the memory has been questioned in the past (chi-square test). 
b. Willingness to question the memory in the future (t-test). 
c. Perceived average reliability of verification strategies (t-test). 
d. Perceived average cost of verification strategies (t-test). 
e. Perceived average likelihood of strategy use (t-test). 
 
3. Next, we will then examine the relation between composite memory function score and: 
 
a. Whether the memory has been questioned in the past (logistic regression). 
b. Willingness to question the memory in the future (Pearson correlation). 
c. Perceived reliability of verification strategies. (Pearson correlation). 
d. Perceived cost of verification strategies. (Pearson correlation). 





e. Perceived likelihood of strategy use. (Pearson correlation). 
 
4. Finally, where appropriate given the findings of (2), (3), and (4) above, we will conduct 
mediation analyses (or, in the case of the categorical dependent variable, logistic regression) 
to examine the extent to which memory function composite score mediates the effect of 
valence on the relevant dependent variable(s). 
 
6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) 
for excluding observations. 
We will have three exclusion criteria: 
 
1. We will exclude participants who incorrectly answer at least 1 of our 2 attention check 
questions. 
 
2. We will exclude participants who provided inadequate work (e.g., copying text from a 
webpage, not following instructions, typing random or nonsensical text when describing their 
memory); we will employ two raters to establish reliability of these decisions. 
 
3. We will exclude participants who fail to provide five different strategies for verifying their 
memories. 
 
7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? 
No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be 
determined. 
Assuming a medium effect size (e.g., d = 0.5) and 95% power, 150 (non-excluded) 
participants per cell (N = 300 in total) provides us with sufficient power to address our 
research questions, even with a correction for multiple comparisons (alpha = .01). 
(https://davidakenny.shinyapps.io/MedPower/). 
 
8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? 
(e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses 
planned?) 
We have collected the data but have not yet conducted any coding or analysis. 
 
If we find significant effects of memory function score on any of the other DVs outlined in 
(3), we will conduct exploratory regression analyses to examine whether any of the memory 






























MEMORY VERIFICATION DECISIONS 




Thank you for showing interest in this study. Please read this information sheet carefully 
before you decide whether or not to participate. If you decide to participate, we thank you in 
advance. If you decide not to take part, there will be no disadvantage to you of any kind and 
we thank you for considering our request. 
 
What is the aim of this project? 
This study was designed to investigate people's memory for childhood events and is being 
undertaken as part of the requirements for Amy Spies' Master's in Psychology. 
 
What types of participants are being sought? 
We are seeking adult participants of any age, gender, and ethnicity. Participants recruited 
through Mechanical Turk will receive the nominal monetary value stated on the HIT selected 
from www.mturk.com 
 
What will participants be asked to do? 
Should you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to (1) describe in detail a 
memory for a childhood event, (2) answer questions about this event, and (3) provide 
demographic information. 
In total, this study will take approximately 10 - 15 minutes to complete. Once you complete 
the study and submit your answers, you will receive your monetary reimbursement.  
 
IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER: The life events that you will be asked to describe may be 
emotional in nature. It is possible that some people may experience distress or discomfort 
when describing these events. Please be aware that at any point and for any reason, you may 
decide not to continue in the study without any disadvantage to yourself. 
 
What data or information will be collected, and what use will be made of it? 
Should you agree to partake in this study, the information you provide will be coded. The 
data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only the researcher's directly 
involved in the study will be able to access it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be 
kept for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal information (e.g. contact details) will 
be destroyed at the completion of the research even though the data derived from the research 





project will, in most cases, be kept for much longer or possibly indefinitely. The results of 
this study may be published and will be available in the University of Otago library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
Can participants change their mind and withdraw from the study? 
You may withdraw from participating in the study at any time and without any disadvantage 
to yourself. 
 
What if participants have questions? 




Amy Spies, BSc  
Master's Candidate 
Department of Psychology 




Rachel Zajac, PhD 
Associate Professor 
Department of Psychology 





This study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of Otago 
Psychology Department. However, if you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the 
research, you may contact the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee through the 
Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +6434798256 or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). 
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed 

































MEMORY VERIFICATION DECISIONS 




You have read the Information Sheet above and understand what this study is about. All your 
questions have been answered to your satisfaction, and you understand that you are free to 
request further information at any stage. 
 
You know that: 
 
1. Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. 
 
2. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without any disadvantage. 
3. If there are any questions you feel uncomfortable answering, you may decline to do so by 
withdrawing from the study. 
4. Personal identifying information will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project, but any 
raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for at 
least five years. 
5. As part of this study, you will be required to describe memories for emotional events that 
you have experienced. You are satisfied that this will not cause you overwhelming levels of 
distress. 
 
6. Upon completion of the 10-15 minute survey, you will receive the nominal monetary value 
stated on the HIT that you selected from www.mturk.com.  
 
7. The results of this study may be published and will be available in the University of Otago 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) library but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity 
 
If you do not wish to participate in this study, close your web browser now. 
 
If you do wish to participate in this study, click on the 'I consent' button below and then click 
the 'next' button to begin the study. 
  
  
 
